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In 2001, the California Supreme Court embarked upon a novel 
experiment in its right of publicity jurisprudence. The court 
imported a single element from copyright's fair use analysis. That 
element—transformative use—has since become an enormously 
important defense for publicity defendants. Unfortunately, the 
transformative use doctrine is notoriously protean, and has resulted 
in significant confusion in publicity law that almost certainly chills 
protected speech. Many courts seem to lack a clear idea of what a 
sophisticated transformative use analysis should even look like. This 
article unpacks these issues and proposes improvements to this 
difficult legal area. 
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In 2001, the California Supreme Court embarked upon a novel 
experiment in its right of publicity jurisprudence. The right of 
publicity, which grants celebrities and others the ability to control 
certain uses of their identities, 1  had always had a contested 
relationship with First Amendment free speech principles. By 
allowing publicity plaintiffs to punish various uses of their personae, 
the free expression of speakers who wished to celebrate, critique, 
comment on, or remix celebrity identity 2  was unquestionably 
threatened to some degree. Although there were a variety of extant 
judicial doctrines designed to ameliorate this tension between 
publicity rights and free expression, the California high court in 
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup3 chose to strike out into 
uncharted doctrinal territory, importing from copyright law a single 
element of copyright’s fair use analysis. This element, 
transformative use, has since become an enormously important 
defense for publicity defendants. Transformative use essentially 
means that a borrower adds new insights or aesthetic variation when 
borrowing expressive materials from others.4 
But the transformative doctrine—plucked from copyright law 
and deposited into the alien domain of right of publicity law—has 
proven to be an ineffective carrier of First Amendment values. For 
a variety of reasons, transformative use is not a particularly good fit 
as a stand-in for free expression interests. But beyond this basic 
                                                                                                             
1 JENNIFER E. ROTHMAN, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: PRIVACY REIMAGINED 
FOR A PUBLIC WORLD 1 (2018). 
2 Although right of publicity law is primarily the province of celebrities, 
ordinary people can succeed in publicity suits as well in many jurisdictions. 
3 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
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problem of fit, the doctrine is notoriously protean.5 In fact, many 
courts don’t seem to have a clear idea of what a transformative use 
analysis should even look like, as this Article will demonstrate. As 
noted I.P. commentator J. Thomas McCarthy put it, the 
transformative test is “subjective in application, unpredictable in 
outcome, and fraught with ambiguity. Difficulty of application and 
incertitude of result are the hallmarks of the court’s ‘transformative’ 
test.”6 Unfortunately, this unpredictability can lead to an analysis 
that is so slippery and sometimes arbitrary that speakers (and their 
counsel) simply lack a clear idea of how the courts might treat their 
particular appropriations in the event of litigation. This lack of 
clarity, in turn, can produce chilling effects on what might otherwise 
be protected speech. 
This Article unpacks these issues and proposes possible 
improvements to the transformative use doctrine. 7  First, we 
chronicle the origins of transformative use analysis in copyright 
doctrine. Next, we explore the California Supreme Court’s 
importation of the transformative test from copyright into right of 
publicity law. We then provide a taxonomy of the various modes of 
transformative use that courts have adopted in publicity cases in the 
wake of Comedy III. Finally, we offer suggestions for an improved 
analysis in this difficult area of the law. 
 
                                                                                                             
5 Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: 
Intellectual Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years After Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 92 (2014). 
 
6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 2 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY 264 
(2017). 
7 Other works that have explored related aspects of right of publicity doctrine 
include: Justin L. Rand, Case Comment: Transformative Use and the Right of 
Publicity: A Relationship Ready for Revision, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
335 (2014-2015); Matthew R. Grothouse, Collateral Damage:  Why the 
Transformative Use Test Confounds Publicity Rights Law, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
474 (2014); Stacy L. Dogan & Mark Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn from Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006);  F. Jay Dougherty, 
All the World’s Not a Stooge: The “Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a 
First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 (2003); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003).   
3
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I. THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAIR USE LAW 
 
Although the origins of what became the transformative use 
doctrine in copyright law go back some years,8 the locus classicus 
of the doctrine is a 1990 Harvard Law Review article by federal 
judge and legal scholar Pierre N. Leval.9 Judge Leval, who as of this 
writing serves on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
sought in the article to provide a more precise grounding for fair use 
doctrine. Fair use is designed to allow individuals to borrow some 
unspecified amount of copyrighted expression without permission 
or payment under certain circumstances.10 As one commentator put 
it, fair use “is an important safety valve that acts as a bulwark against 
the monopoly power that inheres in an exclusive right [for copyright 
owners] and which leads owners of such rights to act in ways 
contrary to the public interest.”11 
Leval’s approach was driven by the uncertainty that he claimed 
inhered in the fair use caselaw of the time. Although the fair use 
statute,12 part of the federal Copyright Act, already contained a four-
part test for determining whether a particular use was fair (including 
such factors as how much of the work the borrower appropriated and 
whether the borrower’s work affected the market value of the 
original), Leval was concerned that fair use decisions by courts were 
wildly inconsistent. “Earlier decisions provide little basis for 
predicting later ones,” Leval wrote. “Reversals and divided courts 
are commonplace. . . . Decisions are not governed by consistent 
principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to 
individual fact patterns.”13 
To repair this Babelian state of affairs, Leval proposed that fair 
use analysis should be aligned with the central purpose of copyright 
                                                                                                             
8 Prior to the creation of the transformative use rubric, courts had at times 
applied a doctrine of “productive use” that had some similar properties.  See Laura 
G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use Factor in Fair Use 
Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995). 
9 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 
(1990). 
10 See WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2011). 
11 Id. at 6. 
12 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
13 Leval, supra note 9, at 1106-1107. 
4
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law itself, which was to incentivize authors to create original works 
that stimulated artistic and intellectual progress.14 The same concern 
for progress that was the underpinning of copyright writ large should 
drive fair use analysis as well—successful fair users should, Leval 
wrote, engage in transformative uses of the material they 
appropriated rather than simply engaging in verbatim borrowing. 
Leval argued that:  
 
[i]f . . . the secondary use adds value to the original—if the 
quoted material is used as raw material, transformed in the 
creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights or 
understandings—this is the very type of activity that the fair 
use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of 
society.15 
 
Leval’s proposed transformative use analysis was, with 
surprising alacrity, adopted by the U. S. Supreme Court in 1993’s 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.16 The dispute in Campbell arose 
when rap group 2 Live Crew borrowed a few musical and lyrical 
elements from the popular Roy Orbison hit song, “Oh, Pretty 
Woman,” and created a crude rap parody that quickly drew a 
copyright infringement suit from the song’s publisher.17 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the rappers’ 
commercial purpose in creating the parody weighed against a 
finding of fair use, but a unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice David Souter, reversed.18 
Justice Souter acknowledged that commercial use by a putative 
fair user had at times been regarded as a black mark under the 
“purpose and character of the use” factor from the statute. 19  
However, following Judge Leval, the Court reasoned that the 
                                                                                                             
14 Id. at 1110; See U.S. Const. art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress to 
pass copyright and patent statutes “To promote the Progress of Science and the 
useful arts . . .”). 
15 Leval, supra note 10, at 1111. 
16 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
17 Id. at 573. 
18 Id. at 594. 
19 Id. at 583-584. 
5
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inquiry should instead focus on whether the borrowing work was 
transformative, that is, whether it added “something new with a 
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message.” 20  This “new expression, 
meaning or message” formulation was the heart of the Court’s 
explication of the nascent doctrine of transformative use. Although 
there was reasonable evidence to conclude that 2 Live Crew’s use 
of “Oh, Pretty Woman” indeed met this standard, the Court declined 
to so find. Rather the Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit 
with the tepid observation that “it is fair to say that 2 Live Crew’s 
song reasonably could be perceived as commenting on the original, 
or criticizing it, to some degree.”21 
Notably, 2 Live Crew did not alter the relatively small amount 
of musical and lyrical materials borrowed from the original song. 
Instead, the rappers reproduced those items verbatim and added 
various other elements to the mix that the Court ultimately suggested 
might be transformative, since the entire work, rife with crude 
sexual references, seemed to critique or comment on the innocent 
naivete of the original song.22 
In the wake of Campbell, and with no further guidance from the 
high court, lower federal courts created an assortment of differing 
conceptions of transformative use, some of which contradicted each 
other.23 One model, dubbed “new insights,” seemed to require that 
the borrowing work provide some comment on or critique of the 
original work 24 —absent that connection, the use was not 
transformative. Another conception, “creative metamorphosis,” 
required no connection between the borrowing work and the 
original, but simply asked whether sufficient aesthetic variation 
(however that might be operationalized) could be observed when 
comparing the borrowing work to the original.25 If so, the use was 
                                                                                                             
20 Id. at 573. 
21 Id. at 583. 
22 Id. at 581-582. 
23 For further explanation and development of the three models, see Bunker 
& Calvert, supra note 5, 102-125. 
24 See, e.g., Liebovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
25 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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transformative. The borrowing work did not need to evince any link 
to the original in any particular way, or even at all. A third strand, 
the “new purpose” approach, found that even verbatim borrowings 
could be labeled transformative, as long as the borrowing work was 
employed for a different purpose or function than the original.26 For 
example, this “new purpose” conception could support as 
transformative a borrower taking a work that was created for 
marketing purposes and reproducing it, unaltered, for use in a news 
or information context.27 
As these differing conceptions of transformative use were being 
refined in copyright law, courts also began applying the doctrine in 
right of publicity cases. It is to that act of judicial appropriation that 
we now turn. 
 
II. TRANSFORMATIVE USE COLONIZES PUBLICITY DOCTRINE 
 
In 2001, the California Supreme Court for the first time imported 
transformative use analysis into a tort case sounding in right of 
publicity law. The state high court’s opinion in Comedy III 
Productions v. Saderup,28 while not particularly convincing at a 
theoretical level, soon led to other courts following suit.29 Comedy 
III arose when Saderup created a drawing, reproduced and sold on 
t-shirts and lithographs, of The Three Stooges, an iconic comedy 
ensemble. The entity entrusted with licensing for the Stooges then 
filed suit, alleging a publicity violation.30   
On appeal, the California Supreme Court recognized that 
Saderup’s likeness of the Stooges was an expressive work eligible 
for First Amendment protection, even though it was created and 
marketed for commercial gain. 31  The court also recognized that 
expressive uses of celebrity identity often serve important First 
Amendment purposes: “[b]ecause celebrities take on public 
meaning, the appropriation of their likenesses may have important 
                                                                                                             
26 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). 
27 See, e.g., Nunez v. Caribbean Int’l News Corp., 235 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2000). 
28 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
29 See cases cited and discussed in remaining sections of this Article. 
30 Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 800. 
31 Id. at 802. 
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uses in uninhibited debate about public issues, particularly debates 
about culture and values.”32 Nonetheless, the court reasoned, all 
expressive works are not insulated from the reach of the publicity 
tort. 33  In striking a balance between publicity rights and First 
Amendment free expression interests, the California Supreme Court 
pointed out that other courts had produced a variety of tests, none of 
which the court found sufficient. 34  Noting that some academic 
commentators had proposed borrowing the fair use standard from 
copyright law, the state high court reasoned that the entire fair use 
test was not a good fit in publicity cases, but that one element, 
transformative use, was the appropriate inquiry. 35  The court, 
drawing from Campbell, found the appropriate test to be whether 
“the work in question adds something new, with a further purpose 
or different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message.”36  
Applying its new First Amendment standard, the court ruled that 
a straightforward, accurate rendition of a plaintiff’s persona, as 
Saderup had produced, was not transformative and thus not 
protected against a right of publicity claim.37 However, when the 
defendant creates a transformative use involving the plaintiff’s 
identity, that additional expressive content strengthens the First 
Amendment interests involved.38 In addition, the transformative use 
of a persona is “less likely to interfere with the economic interest 
protected by the right of publicity.” 39  The court restated the 
transformativeness test as “whether the celebrity likeness is one of 
the ‘raw materials’ from which the original work is synthesized, or 
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum 
and substance of the work in question.”40 
                                                                                                             
32 Id. at 803. 
33 Id. at 804-805. 
34 For a survey of some of these tests, see, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 
F.3d 141, 153-161 (3d Cir. 2013). 
35 Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 807-08. 
36 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). 
37 Id. at 811. 
38 Id. at 808. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 809. 
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The Comedy III court also provided a “subsidiary inquiry” that 
asked whether the marketability of the work in question derived 
primarily from the plaintiff’s fame or from the creativity and 
reputation of the defendant.41 In the latter case, the First Amendment 
should protect the work. 
Several points are worth noting from Comedy III. First, unlike 
fair use in copyright, which is a statutory limit on the exclusive 
rights of copyright holders, the Comedy III court was employing the 
transformative use doctrine as a constitutional First Amendment 
standard. This was not the purpose for which Judge Leval had 
synthesized the doctrine, nor the use to which it was put by the Court 
in Campbell. Second, by declining to consider the other parts of the 
copyright fair use analysis, the California Supreme Court had 
plucked a single element from that complex, multi-factor 
determination and installed it as the exclusive route to First 
Amendment protection for right of publicity defendants. In 
copyright law, the Campbell Court had made clear, the absence of a 
transformative use was not the death knell of a fair use claim. In the 
Comedy III publicity regime, First Amendment protection rose or 
fell based on that factor alone. Rather than an incremental 
development in standard legal doctrine, as the opinion seemed to 
imply, Comedy III was in fact a radical and undertheorized departure 
from traditional First Amendment analysis.  
 
III. IDENTIFYING THE LOCUS OF TRANSFORMATION 
 
After Comedy III, Courts both inside and outside of California, 
including influential federal courts, 42  began applying the 
transformative use test in publicity cases. However, the test appears 
to mean different things to different courts. One of the key divisions 
is on the question of the required locus of any transformative 
changes wrought by the defendant. In other words, must the 
defendant transform the borrowed persona itself or can it claim a 
transformative use if it places the unaltered persona into a work that, 
as a whole, has transformative elements? To shed more light on this, 
consider transformative doctrine as applied in the Campbell case in 
                                                                                                             
41 Id. at 810. 
42E.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Co., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).  
9
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the copyright context. 2 Live Crew did not transform the borrowed 
materials from “Oh, Pretty Woman.” Instead, the rappers 
appropriated verbatim musical phrases and lyrics from the song and 
surrounded those with other expressive elements that resulted in an 
entirely new work. That is often how transformative use is applied 
in copyright doctrine—the defendant need not engage in creative 
metamorphosis with the borrowed materials themselves, but can 
instead place the unaltered, appropriated elements into the context 
of a new work that, as a whole, offers new meaning, message, or 
expression. 
Interestingly, and perhaps unfortunately, Comedy III itself did 
not address this question since the facts of the case did not offer any 
opportunity to do so. The Comedy III court did not make entirely 
clear exactly where the requisite transformation needed to occur—
did the celebrity persona itself need to be transformed, or could the 
celebrity persona, unaltered, be situated in the context of a larger 
transformative work and still be protected? This confusion was 
somewhat understandable, since the personae of the Stooges was in 
fact the entirety of the work in Comedy III—the “work” consisted 
solely of the likenesses of The Three Stooges on t-shirts and 
lithographs. Thus, there was no occasion to consider a contextual 
transformative work in which the persona was reproduced 
unchanged within a work that featured other transformative 
elements. Nonetheless, there is language in Comedy III that suggests 
that an appropriation can be transformative without performing any 
alteration on the persona itself. At one point, the court, in elaborating 
its distinction between the persona being one of the “raw materials” 
of the defendant’s work versus the “sum and substance” of the work, 
states that “we ask . . . whether a product containing a celebrity’s 
likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness. And 
when we use the word ‘expression,’ we mean expression of 
something other than the likeness of the celebrity.”43 
Later publicity cases applying the transformative doctrine 
appear to have split into at least three camps. This paper refers to the 
approach requiring alteration of the persona itself as “atomistic” 
                                                                                                             
43 Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 809. 
10
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decisions, and the approach allowing broader contextual 
transformation as “holistic” decisions.44 As well, other courts have 
focused primarily on the quantity of the taking in relation to the 
defendant’s work, without significant attention to the amount the 
second work transforms the persona.45   
 
IV. ATOMISTIC APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMATION 
 
A clear example of the atomistic approach is found in the Third 
Circuit case Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc.,46  in which a majority 
found the appropriation to be non-transformative. Hart arose after 
video game company Electronic Arts used elements of college 
football players’ personae in its NCAA Football game series.47 Ryan 
Hart, a quarterback for the Rutgers University football team, 
objected to the creation of virtual players (avatars) that resembled 
real-life college football players and shared playing stats and 
biographical details with their real-life counterparts. 48  After a 
federal district court granted summary judgment to EA on First 
Amendment grounds, the Third Circuit reversed. 
In reviewing the lower court decision, the Third Circuit majority 
was clear that video games are entitled to First Amendment 
protection as expressive works.49 Nonetheless, that protection was 
not unlimited when in conflict with other competing interests, 
including the right of publicity. The majority then canvassed judicial 
                                                                                                             
44 See cases cited and discussed in Parts IV and V, infra. 
45 See cases cited and discussed in Part VI, infra. 
46 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 573 U.S. 989 (2014).  Alongside 
Hart, an almost identical analysis of a nearly identical fact pattern can be found 
in Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).  The two cases are 
strikingly similar in that both feature a two-judge majority applying an atomistic 
approach, with a single dissenting judge urging a broader and more contextual 
consideration of transformativeness. Other largely atomistic court decisions 
include Davis v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015); Mine O’ Mine, 
Inc. v. Calmese, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75236 (D. Nev. 2011); Diller v. Barry 
Driller, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133515 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Mitchell v. Cartoon 
Network, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157737 (D. N.J. 2015). 
47 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 147 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 U.S. 2729, 2733 
(2011)). 
11
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tests designed to balance free expression interests against the right 
of publicity, including “the commercial-interest-based Predominant 
Use Test, the trademark-based Rogers test, and the copyright-based 
Transformative Use Test,”50 ultimately concluding that the latter 
was the court’s preferred mode of analysis. 
In applying the transformative test, the majority focused almost 
exclusively on whether EA transformed Hart’s persona itself. As the 
court put it, “we must determine whether [Hart’s] identity is 
sufficiently transformed in NCAA Football.”51  This singular focus 
on the persona itself led the majority to reason that because the 
digital avatar closely resembled Hart, and because the biographical 
and statistical information on Hart was accurate, there was nothing 
transformative about EA’s use of those items.52  The majority did 
briefly consider the world into which the avatar was placed, but 
found insufficient transformation since the context was a digitally 
recreated football game, the very same activity the real-life Hart 
gained fame in pursuing. 
The majority also rejected EA’s argument that an interactive 
feature that allowed users to alter the appearances of the avatars was 
sufficiently transformative.  Such a finding would open the door to 
“cynical abuse,” the court reasoned, since “video game companies 
could commit the most blatant acts of misappropriation only to 
absolve themselves by including a feature that allows users to 
modify the digital likenesses.”53  The Third Circuit also rejected 
EA’s claim that other creative features of the game amounted to a 
transformative use, since those features, “do not affect Appellant’s 
digital avatar.”54 The majority’s analysis here is roughly equivalent 
to the “new insights” paradigm in copyright fair use cases, in which, 
to be transformative, the borrower must comment on or in some way 
offer new understandings of the borrowed expression.55 In other 
words, the creative context into which the borrowed material is 
placed must interact with or operate upon it sufficiently to affect the 
reader or viewers’ perception of the borrowed expression. 
                                                                                                             
50 717 F.3d at 153. 
51 Id. at 165. 
52 Id. at 167. 
53 Id. at 167 
54 Id. at 169. 
55 See note 24 and related text, supra. 
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Although the Hart court did make a brief, half-hearted detour 
into contextual aspects of the game, its analysis is overwhelmingly 
atomistic. Transformation must occur, if at all, in the use of the 
persona itself, or, possibly, in other expressive features of the work 
that have a significant impact on the persona. In dissent, Judge 
Thomas L. Ambro objected that “[his] colleagues limit effectively 
the transformative inquiry to Hart’s identity alone, disregarding 
other features of the work.”56 Judge Ambro pointed out that this 
approach penalized realistic depictions of actual persons that were 
routinely protected in other media.57 The dissent also made clear 
that this methodology is inconsistent with the one advocated for by 
the California Supreme Court in Comedy III and later cases. Instead 
of the majority’s cramped approach, Ambro reasoned, “we must 
examine the creative work in the aggregate to determine whether it 
satisfies the Transformative Use Test and merits First Amendment 
protection.”58 
In his own analysis, Judge Ambro found that not only did EA’s 
video game offer “myriad original graphics, videos, sound effects,” 
and the like, but it also allowed players to create game scenarios in 
which players who had never competed against each other in real 
life competed in the virtual world of the game.59 Moreover, certain 
game modes allowed game players to direct multiple seasons of play 
with unique virtual player combinations. “Such modes of interactive 
play,” Ambro wrote, “are imaginative transformations of the games 
played by real players.”60 
The atomistic approach seems misguided in light of the 
transformative use doctrine’s origin. In copyright law, no court 
requires the borrowed portion of plaintiff’s expression be altered in 
some way to produce a transformative use. Rather, the expectation 
is that unaltered borrowed materials will be combined into to a larger 
work that is itself transformative. 61  The atomistic approach in 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. at 171 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting). 
61 See, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (appropriation 
artist’s use of defendant’s photographs was transformative since the defendant’s 
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publicity cases completely ignores the creative work of the 
defendant if the persona itself is not transmogrified in some fashion. 
The approach is also at odds with language in Comedy III suggesting 
that if the persona is one of the raw materials in the creation of a 
larger expressive work, the use is therefore transformative.62 
 
V. HOLISTIC APPROACHES TO TRANSFORMATION 
 
A holistic approach to the transformative inquiry is found in a 
2013 California court of appeals decision, Ross v. Roberts. 63  In 
Ross, defendant, a rapper, appropriated the name and persona of a 
celebrated drug dealer, Rick Ross. Ross had achieved notoriety as a 
high-volume cocaine distributer in the 1980s. The defendant, 
William Leonard Roberts II, was apparently inspired by Ross’ 
felonious exploits and began a career as a rapper under the name 
Rick Ross. Some of Roberts’ songs bragged about cocaine 
trafficking and other illicit deeds. When the real Rick Ross learned 
about Roberts’ appropriation of his name and persona, he 
commenced a lawsuit alleging violation of his right of publicity and 
related claims. 
On the question of transformative use, the California appellate 
                                                                                                             
work, as a whole, was quite different in character from plaintiff’s work). 
62 This point was seemingly reinforced in Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 
(Cal. 2003), although the case is not entirely clear since it did in fact involve 
significant alterations to the personae of the plaintiffs, rock musicians Johnny and 
Edgar Winter, who were presented as evil half-human, half-worm characters in a 
comic book.  Nonetheless, the court alluded to a holistic view when it pointed out 
that “plaintiffs are merely part of the raw materials from which the comic books 
were synthesized [and were contained in] a larger story, which is itself quite 
expressive.” Id. at 479.  The latter statement seems to suggest that more than just 
changes in a plaintiff’s persona are salient in the transformative determination.  
For another primarily atomistic analysis that nonetheless gestured in the direction 
of holism, see No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2d Div. 2011). 
63 Ross v. Roberts, 222 Cal. App. 677 (Ca. Ct. App., 2013). In addition to the 
holistic cases discussed in the text, see, e.g., Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 
894 (9th Cir. 2010); Daniels v. Wayans, 8 Cal. App. 5th 367 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017); 
Washington v. Take-Two Interactive Software, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
7975 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F.Supp.2d 924 (N.D. 
Ohio 2004).   
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court had little difficulty concluding that the use was transformative, 
even though the plaintiff’s name was taken verbatim. Citing Comedy 
III, the court reasoned that even though the defendant adopted the 
name “Rick Ross” and wrote songs about cocaine trafficking, these 
elements were merely the “’raw material’ from which Roberts’ 
music career was synthesized.64 But these are not the ‘very sum and 
substance’ of Roberts’ work.”65 
Rather than focus on the verbatim taking of the plaintiff’s name, 
as an atomistic court might, the court examined the 
rapper/defendant’s entire oeuvre and determined that the artistic 
universe into which the name and persona of Ross had been 
transported was highly transformative, since it added new 
expression to the plaintiff’s story. “Using the name and certain 
details of an infamous criminal’s life as its basic elements, he 
created original artistic works,” the court wrote.66 
Critically, the Ross court was not fixated on whether the 
appropriated materials themselves were altered, as was the court in 
Hart. The Ross court looked beyond the borrowed material itself and 
asked whether the entire work (or works) into which the borrowed 
material is placed add “new expression, meaning, or message” as a 
whole. Accordingly, the use was transformative and thus protected 
by the First Amendment. 
The Ross court also briefly explored the “subsidiary inquiry” 
from Comedy III that asks whether the economic value of the 
defendant’s work is primarily derived from the plaintiff’s fame.67 
The court answered this question in the defendant’s favor as well, 
reasoning that “when individuals purchase music, they generally do 
so in order to listen to music that they enjoy. It defies credibility to 
suggest that Roberts gained success primarily from appropriation of 
plaintiff’s name and identity, instead of from the music and 
professional persona that he (and other defendants) created.”68 It’s 
worth noting that this analysis is also holistic in that it focuses on 
the overall rationale for plaintiff’s success, rather than the simple 
                                                                                                             
64 Ross v. Roberts, 222 Cal. App. 677 at 688. 
65 Id. at 687 (quoting Comedy III (citations omitted)). 
66 Id. at 687-88. 
67 Id. at 688. 
68 Id. at 688. 
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fact that he appropriated another’s persona and may as a result have 
gotten some initial attention from the public. 
Another strongly holistic opinion is the Sixth Circuit’s 2003 
decision in favor of an artist who painted Tiger Woods in ETW Corp. 
v. Jireh Publ’g Inc.69 In ETW Corp., sports artist Rick Rush had 
painted a work titled “The Masters of Augusta” commemorating 
Woods’ remarkable win at the 1997 Masters Tournament. 70  In 
addition to Woods’ record 12-stroke victory, the win at the 
previously exclusionary tournament by a golfer of color was also 
considered a landmark. Rush’s painting featured three standard 
images of Woods going about his business on the course, with a 
ghostly pantheon of golf demigods, including Arnold Palmer, 
Bobby Jones, and others, looking on.71 ETW, the corporate arm of 
Woods’ empire, filed suit alleging right of publicity violations, 
trademark infringement, and other related claims.   
The court applied various tests to the publicity claim, but the 
transformative analysis is particularly interesting for purposes of 
this paper. The Sixth Circuit majority ruled that despite the unaltered 
depiction of Woods, the entirety of the painting was 
transformative. 72   “Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a 
literal depiction of Woods,” the court reasoned.73 “Rather, Rush’s 
work consists of a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image 
which are combined to describe, in artistic form, a historic event in 
sports history and to convey a message about the significance of 
Woods’s achievement.” 74  The court thus concluded that the 
“substantial transformative elements” 75  involved in the painting 
meant that the work was protected by the First Amendment. 
The Sixth Circuit’s approach in ETW Corp. is unquestionably a 
holistic one, since the court paid little attention to the fact that the 
Woods’ likeness was unaltered and focused exclusively on the 
transformativeness of entire expressive work. 
                                                                                                             
69 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Co., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
70 Id. at 918. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 938. 
73 Id.  
74 Id. 
75 Id.  
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VI. THE DE MINIMIS MODEL 
  
One 2018 California publicity case seemed to focus less on 
transformative use as some sort of aesthetic reconfiguration (either 
of the persona or of the larger work) and more on the quantitatively 
minor role the plaintiff’s persona played in the entire work. In De 
Havilland v. FX Networks LLC,76 screen legend Olivia de Havilland 
objected to a television miniseries, Feud: Bette and Joan. The 
production, which was centered on the enmity between actresses 
Joan Crawford and Bette Davis, included Catherine Zeta-Jones 
portraying de Havilland.77 As the court of appeals noted, the de 
Havilland character was featured for fewer than 17 minutes of the 
entire series’ 392-minute run.78 De Havilland was portrayed giving 
an interview in which she discusses Hollywood’s treatment of 
women and in a segment interacting with Bette Davis.79 As the court 
pointed out, de Havilland was portrayed positively as “beautiful, 
glamorous, self-assured, and considerably ahead of her time in her 
views on the importance of equality and respect for women in 
Hollywood.”80 
Nonetheless, the real de Havilland was unhappy with the 
portrayal, including one scene in which the de Havilland character 
refers to her sister as a “bitch.”81 De Havilland brought a variety of 
privacy-related claims, including one for violation of California’s 
statutory right of publicity. In the trial court, FX filed a motion to 
strike under California’s anti-SLAPP law, which the trial court 
denied.82 
On appeal, the court of appeals made short work of the publicity 
claim, since it found the docudrama to be fully protected by the First 
Amendment against the right of publicity claim. 83  The court 
                                                                                                             
76 De Havilland v. FX Networks LLC, 21 Cal. App. 5th 845 (Ca. Ct. App.,. 
2018). 
77 Id. at 850. 
78 Id. at 851. 
79 Id.  
80 Id. 
81 Feud: Betty and Joan (FX television broadcast March 5, 2017). 
82 De Havilland, 21 Cal. App. 5th at 851. 
83 Id. at 861-862. 
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nonetheless also engaged in a transformativeness analysis, which 
appeared to be a kind of alternative holding on the publicity 
question.84 
The trial court had ruled that a docudrama that attempted to 
make its characters as close to reality as possible could not be 
transformative.85 The appellate court disagreed, pointing out that 
“the fictitious, ‘imagined’ interview in which Zeta-Jones talks about 
the Hollywood’s treatment of women and the Crawford/Davis 
rivalry is a far cry from T-shirts depicting a representational, 
pedestrian, uncreative drawing of The Three Stooges.”86 Moreover, 
the court focused on the fact that the de Havilland role merely 
amounted to around 4 percent of Feud.87  The docudrama told many 
stories that had no connection to de Havilland, the court reasoned, 
and the de Havilland story arc was but a tiny segment of the entire 
work.88 The appeals court also cited the “subsidiary inquiry’’ from 
Comedy III and found that the marketability and economic value of 
Feud was derived mainly from the skill and reputation of its creative 
team and not from de Havilland’s fame.89 
Interestingly, the overall transformativeness determination 
focused very little on any creative use of the plaintiff’s persona, 
either atomistically or holistically. Instead, it sounds as if the court 
is applying a sort of de minimis analysis.90 The court’s approach also 
bears a resemblance to the “amount and substantiality of the portion 
used” factor from copyright’s fair use provision, although here the 
California court inverted it by focusing not on the proportion used 
in relation to the size of the plaintiff’s work (as in copyright), but on 
the proportion of the persona used in relation to the size of the 
defendant’s work.91 
De Havilland is thus something of an outlier in the existing 
opinions that apply transformative use analysis. It certainly bases its 
                                                                                                             
84 Id. at 864. 
85 Id. at 863. 
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 863-864. 
89Id. 
90 For a useful look at the de minimis doctrine in copyright law, see Julie D. 
Cromer, Harry Potter and the Three-Second Crime: Are We Vanishing the De 
Minimis defense from Copyright Law? 36 N. M. L. REV. 261 (2006). 
91 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). 
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analysis on the Comedy III subsidiary test about the “marketability 
and economic value” of the work, but it engages in almost no 
attention to any actual transformation by the defendant. Instead, it 
focuses heavily on the quantitative dimension of the persona’s 
appearance in the entire work. Had the Hart court adopted a similar 
analysis, it seems entirely possible that Ryan Hart’s persona was 
deployed in a tiny percentage of the all virtual games played by 
NCAA Football fans. Thus, under this kind of approach, EA might 
have succeeded in demonstrating a transformative use, since it the 
collection of all the avatars that made the game valuable to players. 
Any one player was insignificant in this sense. 
Is the quasi de minimis style of analysis employed in De 
Havilland even something that can be characterized as a 
“transformative use” inquiry? It certainly bears no resemblance to 
the transformative concept as deployed in copyright doctrine. It has 
the virtue of permitting realistic portrayals of human identity to be 
treated as transformative—something the atomistic approach 
eschews. At least two other cases have relied heavily on this analytic 
approach.92 
 
VII. SIDESTEPPING THE TRANSFORMATIVE TEST 
 
At least one recent case, decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2016, 
managed to avoid applying the transformative test entirely. In 
Sarver v. Chartier, 93  the Ninth Circuit considered an army 
sergeant’s claim that the makers of the Oscar-winning film The Hurt 
Locker violated his right of publicity in creating the film’s main 
character, an Army bomb disposal technician in Iraq. The film’s 
screenwriter had previously written a profile of Sarver that appeared 
                                                                                                             
92  Arenas v. Shed Media, 881 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1191 (C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(writing that references to professional basketball player in television show were 
“incidental to the show’s plot as a whole.”); Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, BC 
551747,  L.A. County Superior Court at p. 5 (Oct. 27, 2014) (writing that the video 
game in question was, as a whole, “complex and multi-faceted” and only used the 
persona of deposed Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega in a de minimis 
fashion, thus making his persona one of the “raw materials” of the game, but not 
its “sum and substance.”), decision found at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2014_1028_noriega.pdf. 
93 813 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2016). 
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in a national publication, and Sarver claimed that the film’s main 
character was based upon his life and experiences.94 
The Ninth Circuit, on an anti-SLAPP motion, rejected Sarver’s 
publicity claim not by applying the transformative test, but by 
deploying a much more potent constitutional standard—First 
Amendment strict scrutiny. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis 95  stated 
that it had upheld publicity claims against First Amendment 
challenges in situations in which a defendant “appropriates the 
economic value that the plaintiff has built in an identity or 
performance.”96 As one example of this type of case, the court noted 
that in Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc.97, (discussed earlier in this 
work in connection with the Hart case) it had upheld the right of a 
college football player to recover for use of his likeness in EA’s 
video game. A second line of cases in which publicity rights had 
trumped free speech rights, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, involved use 
of plaintiffs’ personae in advertisements, since commercial speech 
is a less-protected category of expression. “In sum,” the court stated, 
“our precedents have held that speech which either appropriates the 
economic value of a performance or persona or seeks to capitalize 
off a celebrity’s image in commercial advertisements is unprotected 
by the First Amendment against a California right-of-publicity 
claim.”98 
The Ninth Circuit panel reasoned that Sarver’s claim did not fit 
either of those categories. First, The Hurt Locker was not 
commercial speech, but rather a fully protected expressive work.99 
Moreover, unlike plaintiffs in cases such as Keller, Sarver did not 
“invest time and money to build up economic value in a marketable 
                                                                                                             
94 Id. at 896. 
95  The Ninth Circuit panel devoted significant discussion to Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s sole intervention into the First Amendment status of right of publicity 
doctrine. Zacchini is regarded by some commentators as sui generis, since it 
involved a complete appropriation of the plaintiff’s 15-second act, rather than 
being a more standard publicity claim involving name or likeness.  Thus, its 
precedential force in a run-of-the-mill right of publicity suit may be limited. 
96 Sarver, 813 F.3d at 904. 
97 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
98 Sarver, 813 F.3d at 905. 
99 Id. at 906. 
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performance or identity. Rather, Sarver is a private person who lived 
his life and worked his job.”100 Thus, there was no appropriation of 
economic value or free-riding on Sarver’s public persona, since he 
had never even attempted to create one. As a result, in Sarver’s case, 
the right of publicity was appropriately categorized as a content-
based restriction on fully protected speech, which therefore required 
strict scrutiny.101 As is generally the case when strict scrutiny is 
deployed, 102  the Ninth Circuit found that Sarver could not 
demonstrate a compelling interest in penalizing the speech of the 
defendant filmmakers.103 Thus, his right of publicity claim failed. 
Sarver may be the only reported federal circuit case in which 
strict scrutiny was applied to a right of publicity claim. The 
application of strict scrutiny did indeed avoid the need for a 
transformative analysis, although the uses of strict scrutiny were 
nonetheless sharply circumscribed by the Ninth Circuit panel. In 
cases in which a plaintiff worked in some way to create an 
economically valuable persona or performance, or where the use 
involved commercial speech, strict scrutiny would not apply under 
the Sarver formulation. Oddly, Sarver barely mentioned the 
transformative test, instead characterizing Keller not as a case in 
which the use was nontransformative, but as simply a case in which 
the use was unprotected by the First Amendment. In a footnote, the 
Sarver court noted that a transformative use test was “an affirmative 
defense formulated by the California Supreme Court which aims to 
strike a balance between First Amendment interests and a plaintiff’s 
asserted right of publicity. We need not and do not reach the 
question of whether such defense applies in this case.”104 
Does this indicate that the Ninth Circuit is moving away from 
                                                                                                             
100 Id. at 905. 
101 The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s controversial recent decision 
in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), a case in which Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s majority opinion seemingly expanded the concept of content-
based restrictions on speech, which, however defined, have long been subject to 
strict scrutiny review.  See Minch Minchin, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality 
in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 COMM. L. & POL’Y 123 (2017). 
102 For an empirical look at the operation of strict scrutiny in the federal 
courts, see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical 
Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). 
103 Sarver, 813 F.3d at 906. 
104 Id. at 904 note 6. 
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Comedy III’s transformative test? As a federal court sitting in a 
diversity case, the Ninth Circuit is bound to apply the substantive 
law of the state in which the district court sits (although the federal 
constitution of course remains supreme). The Ninth Circuit did this 
when it applied California’s anti-SLAPP statute. However, the 
transformative use doctrine was relegated to a footnote. This may 
call into question the legal status of transformative use, since the 
Comedy III court seemed to present it as not merely a creature of 
state law, but as a rule of constitutional dimension to sort out 
conflicts between the First Amendment and the right of publicity. In 
copyright’s version of fair use (of which the transformative doctrine 
is a key aspect), fair use serves as a statutory proxy for free speech 
interests that obviates the need for the application of the First 
Amendment scrutiny structure, including strict scrutiny. 105 
However, Sarver suggests that, whatever the juridical status of 
transformative use in publicity law, it does not similarly substitute 
for First Amendment scrutiny, at least in cases not involving 
commercial speech or an economically valuable persona. Thus, by 
almost completely ignoring the transformative test, Sarver places its 
status in some doubt. 
At least one commentator has attributed the strict scrutiny 
approach in Sarver to the sweeping language of the Supreme Court’s 
Reed case. 106  Professor Genevieve Lakier cited Sarver as one 
example of “Reed’s effects across the country, as courts apply strict 
scrutiny to—and strike down—laws that previously were, or likely 
would have been, upheld as content-neutral prior to Reed.”107 
 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
 
The state of the law at the intersection of the First Amendment 
and the right of publicity is in considerable disarray. Not all courts 
accept the transformative use test, but among those that do, very 
different conceptions of transformation drive the case law. The 
                                                                                                             
105 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003) (writing that “copyright’s 
built-in free speech safeguards are generally adequate” when copyright interests 
conflict with free speech values). 
106 See discussion of Reed, supra note 60. 
107 Genevieve Lakier, Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, and the Rise of the 
Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 235 (2016). 
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atomistic analysis seems the least defensible, since that approach all 
but rules out realistic portrayals of human identity. The more holistic 
analysis is certainly a step in the right direction. At least under the 
holistic model, which is more consistent with transformative use as 
applied in copyright doctrine, defendants can point to a variety of 
expressive efforts in their works to justify their appropriations rather 
than engage in a forced and perhaps artificial alteration of the 
plaintiff’s persona itself in order to find protection under the First 
Amendment. 
On the other hand, the de minimis version of transformative use, 
while still very much a minority position, has some potential in a 
certain class of cases. One advantage of this version is that courts 
are not forced to make artistic judgments about the worth of the 
transformative effort put in by the defendant. Instead, a more 
quantitative judgment can be made based on how much of the new 
work consists of the disputed persona. For a work like the one in De 
Havilland, a lengthy television series, it may not be that difficult for 
a potential defendant to meet the test, since many story arcs can take 
place that don’t necessarily involve the plaintiff.  On the other hand, 
the de minimis model may be more difficult to operationalize if 
employed in the case something less than a sprawling epic—say, a 
painting or a photograph—works without vast expanses of narrative 
space. Even in the setting of a film, how would a filmmaker create 
a work that focused one particular individual (such as a biopic) 
without having that individual’s persona occupy a great deal of the 
narrative real estate? As a version of Comedy III’s “subsidiary 
inquiry” it may have its uses, but it certainly could not successfully 
subsume the transformative inquiry as a whole. 
From a free expression perspective, Sarver represents the most 
radical approach—jettisoning the transformative use doctrine in 
favor of First Amendment strict scrutiny. The Sarver court, of 
course, limited the application of strict scrutiny to cases involving 
essentially unknown plaintiffs in which the persona wasn’t being 
used in a commercial speech context. The latter stipulation makes 
constitutional sense, since strict scrutiny is routinely applied only to 
fully protected speech. However, the notion that strict scrutiny 
should only be applied in the case of purely private figures and not 
deployed in cases in which celebrity plaintiffs seek to punish makers 
of expressive works seems odd. If anything, the First Amendment 
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interest in depictions of the famous and powerful in expressive 
works would be higher rather than lower. As one appellate brief 
expressed this principle:  
 
Indeed, the more important or famous a person is, the more 
imperative that the First Amendment protects the right of 
others to tell her story, including the right to assess and 
criticize her free from the threat of litigation. The First 
Amendment means nothing if it does not protect the rights 
of artists to create controversial, even unflattering, works 
about our leaders and celebrities.108  
 
The Sarver approach essentially reverses the First Amendment 
hierarchy established in cases such as New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan109 in which public official and public figure plaintiffs are 
subject to a higher First Amendment burden than are private figures. 
Of course, Sullivan was a defamation case, which features different 
interests on the plaintiff’s side of the equation than the right of 
publicity, but the inherent value of the defendant’s speech under the 
First Amendment seems quite similar in either scenario. 
Transformative use analysis has proven problematic in publicity 
law. Because important expressive rights are at stake, it is 
imperative that courts take steps to improve and clarify the doctrine, 
most effectively by emphasizing the holistic approach described 
here. Giving more attention to free expression interests that intersect 
with publicity law is a critical step toward improved doctrine in this 
area. 
                                                                                                             
108 Amicus curiae brief of Motion Picture Association of America et al., in 
support of FX Networks in De Havilland v. FX Networks LLC, B285620, Cal. 
Ct. App., 2d Div. (Jan. 25, 2018) at 44, located at 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/center/isp/documents/odh.v.fx_.mpaa_.ami
cus.1.25.18.pdf (last viewed Oct. 23, 2018); see also, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 
1, at 153 (writing that “the analysis in Sarver gets things backward. The court 
gives the least protection to anonymous, fungible individuals, while boosting 
protection for the very individuals we most need to refer to and comment on in 
expressive works.”). 
109New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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